The Ancient Greeks at War

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Anderson, J. K., Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970.

The Greek forces had/have mostly peacekeeping, humanitarian, logistics, reconstruction and support role.Main article: Hoplite A hoplite armed with an aspis and a doru. It is usually agreed that the doru could not be used two-handed with the Aspis. A long chapter on 'War and the economy' covers four main topics. First, Rawlings considers the extent of agricultural damage an invading army could inflict. His reasonable position is that earlier claims of long-term damage are probably exaggerated - as argued by Hanson (3) - but that even the threat of 'short-term famine' could explain why cities often decided to fight to defend their farms (p. 148). He next shows the importance, both material and psychological, of acquisition in war - mainly plunder of various forms including slaves. Again the exertion of state control limited but did not eliminate the ability of soldiers and generals to profit individually from war. A short section considers the economic role of arms production including shipbuilding; given scholarly neglect of this subject even this brief foray is praiseworthy. His final section focuses on the way that wars were financed. He argues for the 'monetarisation of war' in the classical period (p. 160); the market in mercenaries is but the most obvious sign of this. The Greek forces had/have mostly peacekeeping, humanitarian, logistics, reconstruction and support role

Snodgrass, A., "The Hoplite Reform and History," Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 85, 1965, pp.110–122.

Syllabus

Campaigns were often timed with the agricultural season to impact the enemies or enemies' crops and harvest. The timing had to be very carefully arranged so that the invaders' enemy's harvest would be disrupted but the invaders' harvest would not be affected. Late invasions were also possible in the hopes that the sowing season would be affected but this at best would have minimal effects on the harvest. Rawlings, Louis (2007). The Ancient Greeks at War. Manchester University Press. ISBN 978 0 7190 56574. The phalanx was an army tactic the Greeks performed with shields. Each soldier carried a shield in his left arm, which he used to protect both himself and the man on his left. [28] The depth of the phalanx differed depending on the battle and commander, but the width of the formation was considerably greater than its depth. [29] For example, during the battle of Syracuse, the depth of the Athenian army's phalanx was 8 men, while its opponent, the Syracusan army, had a depth of 16 men. [30] Melee [ edit ] One major reason for Phillip's success in conquering Greece was the break with Hellenic military traditions that he made. With more resources available, he was able to assemble a more diverse army, including strong cavalry components. He took the development of the phalanx to its logical completion, arming his 'phalangites' (for they were assuredly not hoplites) with a fearsome 6m (20ft) pike, the ' sarissa'. Much more lightly armored, the Macedonian phalanx was not so much a shield-wall as a spear-wall. The Macedonian phalanx was a supreme defensive formation, but was not intended to be decisive offensively; instead, it was used to pin down the enemy infantry, whilst more mobile forces (such as cavalry) outflanked them. This ' combined arms' approach was furthered by the extensive use of skirmishers, such as peltasts.

Tactically, Phillip absorbed the lessons of centuries of warfare in Greece. He echoed the tactics of Epaminondas at Chaeronea, by not engaging his right wing against the Thebans until his left wing had routed the Athenians; thus in course outnumbering and outflanking the Thebans, and securing victory. Alexander's fame is in no small part due to his success as a battlefield tactician; the unorthodox gambits he used at the battles of Issus and Gaugamela were unlike anything seen in Ancient Greece before. Hanson, Victor (1989). The Western Way of War. University of California Press. p.173. ISBN 978-0-520-26009-2. Many states such as Athens, Argos, Thebes, and Syracuse began to maintain a small professional force ( logades or epilektoi) which could be augmented by the main citizen body if necessary. Armies became more cosmopolitan with the inclusion of resident foreigners, slaves, mercenaries, and neighbouring allies (either voluntary or through compulsion in the case of Sparta's perioikoi). Warfare moved away from one-off battles fought in a few hours to long-drawn-out conflicts which could last for years, the most important being the Persian Wars (first half of the 5th century BCE), the Peloponnesian Wars (459-446 & 431-404 BCE), and the Corinthian Wars (394-386 BCE). The Hoplite Phalanx Van der Heyden, A. A. M. and Scullard, H. H., (eds.), Atlas of the Classical World, London: Nelson, 1959. Hodkinson, Stephen, "Warfare, Wealth, and the Crisis of Spartiate Society," in John Rich and Graham Shipley, (eds.), War and Society in the Greek World, London: Routledge, 1993, pp.146–176.The origins of the hoplite are obscure, and no small matter of contention amongst historians. Traditionally, this has been dated to the 8th century BC, and attributed to Sparta; but more recent views suggest a later date, towards the 7th century BC [ citation needed]. Certainly, by approximately 650 BC, as dated by the Chigi vase, the 'hoplite revolution' was complete. The major innovation in the development of the hoplite seems to have been the characteristic circular shield ( aspis), roughly 1m (3.3ft) in diameter, and made of wood faced with bronze. [2] Although comparatively heavy, the design of this shield was such that it could be supported on the shoulder. More importantly, it permitted the formation of a shield-wall by an army, an impenetrable mass of men and shields. Men were also equipped with metal greaves and also a breastplate made of bronze, leather, or stiff cloth. When this was combined with the primary weapon of the hoplite, 2–3m (6.6–9.8ft) long spear (the doru), it gave both offensive and defensive capabilities. Sieges were usually long-drawn-out affairs with the principal strategy being to starve the enemy into submission. Siege Warfare In the third phase of the war however the use of more sophisticated stratagems eventually allowed the Spartans to force Athens to surrender. Firstly, the Spartans permanently garrisoned a part of Attica, removing from Athenian control the silver mine which funded the war effort. Forced to squeeze even more money from her allies, the Athenian league thus became heavily strained. After the loss of Athenian ships and men in the Sicilian expedition, Sparta was able to foment rebellion amongst the Athenian league, which therefore massively reduced the ability of the Athenians to continue the war.

The war ended when the Persians, worried by the allies' successes, switched to supporting the Spartans, in return for the cities of Ionia and Spartan non-interference in Asia Minor. This brought the rebels to terms, and restored the Spartan hegemony on a more stable footing. The peace treaty which ended the war, effectively restored the status quo ante bellum, although Athens was permitted to retain some of the territory it had regained during the war. The Spartan hegemony would last another 16 years...A brief opening chapter, 'War and peace in ancient Greece', treats general attitudes towards war and peace. Rawlings makes cogent arguments against the view that the default relation between Greek cities was a state of war and that treaties only provided temporary halts in this natural enmity (pp. 8-10). He harps, however, on Thucydides's argument that the period of the Peace of Nicias was not really a time of peace. This is misleading. Thucydides's claim is specific to one period and not a generalisation: indeed, Thucydides presupposes that periods of true peace do exist - or else how could the war have really started in 431? Rawlings rightly emphasises debate and controversy about war (p. 11). Although the horrors of war were well-known (pp. 6-8), a competitive sense of personal and communal honour was a central factor encouraging the recourse to war (p. 14). Brouwers, Josho, Henchmen of Ares: Warriors and Warfare in Early Greece, Rotterdam: Karwansaray Publishers, 2013.