Discourses and Selected Writings (Penguin Classics)

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Blum, Mark L. (1988). "Kiyozawa Manshi and the Meaning of Buddhist Ethics". The Eastern Buddhist. 21 (1): 63. ISSN 0012-8708. JSTOR 44361820. A year after his study of the Āgamas, he received a copy of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus from his disciple Akegarasu Haya, and again Kiyozawa was deeply moved. The universe is wholly governed by an all-wise, divine Providence. [21] All things, even apparent evils, are the will of God, and good from the point of view of the whole. [21] In virtue of our rationality we are neither less nor worse than the gods, for the magnitude of reason is estimated not by length nor by height but by its judgments. [15] The aim of the philosopher therefore is to reach the position of a mind which embraces the whole world. [15] The person who recognizes that every event is necessary and reasonable for the best interest of the whole, feels no discontent with anything outside the control of moral purpose. [21] The Cynic sage [ edit ] Heinrich Ritter, Alexander James William Morrison, (1846), The History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume 4, p. 217

There were originally eight books, but only four now remain in their entirety, along with a few fragments of the others. [8] In a preface attached to the Discourses, Arrian explains how he came to write them: Reason alone is good, the irrational is evil, and the irrational is intolerable to the rational. [46] The good person should labour chiefly on their own reason; to perfect this is in our power. [47] To repel evil opinions by the good is the noble contest in which humans should engage; it is not an easy task, but it promises true freedom, peace of mind ( ataraxia), and a divine command over the emotions ( apatheia). [48] We should especially be on our guard against the opinion of pleasure because of its apparent sweetness and charms. [49] The first object of philosophy, therefore, is to purify the mind. [50] The Discourses, trans. W. A. Oldfather. 2 vols. ( Loeb Classical Library edition.) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925 and 1928. ISBN 0674991451, 0674992407. Epictetus does not paint a rosy picture for the reader. Having been a slave in a cr Both the Discourses and the Enchiridion begin by distinguishing between those things in our power ( prohairetic things) and those things not in our power ( aprohairetic things). [37]

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Epictetus taught that philosophy is a way of life and not simply a theoretical discipline. To Epictetus, all external events are beyond our control; he argues that we should accept whatever happens calmly and dispassionately. However, individuals are responsible for their own actions, which they can examine and control through rigorous self-discipline.

Origen's Contra Celcus, Book vii, episode is in chapter LIII, with a secondary mention of the episode in chapter LIV. The emotions of grief, pity, and even affection are well-known disturbers of the soul. Grief is the most offensive; Epictetus considered the suffering of grief an act of evil. It is a willful act, going against the will of God to have all men share happiness. [79] Psychology [ edit ] George Long, (1890), The Discourses of Epictetus, with the Encheridion and Fragments, p. 390. George Bell and SonsSomewhere in book 2, Epictetus criticizes the Academics and Epicureans of contradictions and, ultimately, self-refutation. Skeptics claim nothing can be known, but yet this proposition if proclaimed to be a general truth - how do they know? Epicureanism claim only individual pleasures should be sought, yet Epicurus himself busied himself with teaching and writing many books to inform others - why bother? As a matter of fact, Epictetus brilliantly remarks, a true Epicurean should teach his students Stoicism, since then he can, being a closet-Epicurean, have all the fun for himself. The teaching Epicurean is a contradiction in terms - he creates other Epicureans who then compete with him for pleasures.... But if everyone in his environment close themselves off from the world, he can then do what he wants. Giovanni Reale, John R. Catan, 1990, A History of Ancient Philosophy: The schools of the Imperial Age, p. 80. SUNY Press a b Heinrich Ritter, Alexander James William Morrison, (1846), The History of Ancient Philosophy, Volume 4, p. 201 A line from the Enchiridion is used as a title quotation in The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman by Laurence Sterne, which translates to, "Not things, but opinions about things, trouble men." [74]

Rowan Stevens (28 February 2022). Wise Quotes – Epictetus (294 Epictetus Quotes): Greek Stoic Philosophy | Quote Collections | Epicurean. Rowan Stevens. ISBN 978-1636051833. Epictetus’ stoicism implies submission to the collective, to the government, and to religion. His conception of a human being itself requires the individual being defined in relation to the city, and then to the “universal city” (the kingdom of god). It is obvious that Epictetus influenced early Christianity here, and sounded the death-knell for individualism, until it would be rediscovered after the Enlightenment. Kors, Alan Charles (1990). Atheism in France, 1650–1729, Volume 1: The Orthodox Sources of Disbelief. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. p.188. ISBN 0691055750. Stanton, G. R. (1969). "Marcus Aurelius, Emperor and Philosopher". Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte. 18 (5): 570–587. JSTOR 4435105. Scholars disagree on whether these three fields relate to the traditional Stoic division of philosophy into Logic, Physics, and Ethics. [19] The third field unambiguously refers to logic since it concerns valid reasoning and certainty in judgment. The second field relates to ethics, and the first field, on desires and aversions, appears to be preliminary to ethics. [19] However Pierre Hadot has argued that this first field relates to physics since for the Stoics the study of human nature was part of the wider subject of the nature of things. [19] What is 'up to us' [ edit ]

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You are in control of/responsible for your judgement, impulse, desire, aversion and mental faculties. The virtuous person knows they have power over these things and can practice discernment in how they perceive and take on the world through their own filtered mind. The Discourses purport to be the actual words of Epictetus. [10] They are written in Koine Greek unlike the Attic Greek Arrian uses in his own compositions. [10] The differences in style are very marked, and they portray a vivid and separate personality. [10] The precise method Arrian used to write the Discourses has long been a matter of vigorous debate. Extreme positions have been held ranging from the view that they are largely Arrian's own compositions to the view that Epictetus actually wrote them himself. [11] The mainstream opinion is that the Discourses report the actual words of Epictetus, even if they cannot be a pure verbatim record. [12] A. A. Long writes: Simplicius, Commentary on the Enchiridion, 46. It is possible that he married her, but Simplicius' language on that subject is ambiguous.

Epictetus was born around AD 50, [6] [7] presumably at Hierapolis, Phrygia. [8] The name his parents gave him is unknown. The word epíktētos (ἐπίκτητος) in Greek simply means "gained" or "acquired"; [9] the Greek philosopher Plato, in his Laws, used the term to mean property that is "added to one's hereditary property." [10] He spent his youth in Rome as a slave to Epaphroditus, a wealthy freedman and secretary to Nero. [11] His social position was thus complicated, combining the low status of a slave with the high status of one with a personal connection to Imperial power. [12] Theodore Scaltsas, Andrew S. Mason (ed.), The Philosophy of Epictetus. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007 ISBN 978-0199585519. William Abbott Oldfather, (1925–8), Discourses. (Loeb Classical Library) ISBN 0-674-99145-1 and ISBN 0-674-99240-7The main purpose of the stoic teaching is to live a life free from fear and anxiety. To achieve this one needs a rigorous training of the faculty of the will and its appreciation of impressions. The knowledge of what is really a vice or a virtue is essential. It seems that to achieve a certain degree of inner peace one should train himself to practice beliefs and habits which most humans indulge in and find very difficult to adhere to, like detachment from material objects, indifference towards blame or praise, acceptance of one’s lot. Epictetus often cites the example of athletes or craftsmen, as if such attitudes are not innate to humans, but acquired through a long apprenticeship. Without this training in the art of life, it is only the existence of slaves which one should expect. It is slavery to worthless objects, petty people, false opinions and vain struggles. This is related to another theoretical weakness. The stoics make much ado about living in harmony with nature (or Zeus). And yet, how can anyone act otherwise? If we are a part of nature, and bound by her laws, how can any of our actions be out of sync with nature? Let’s say, for example, that you get banished from Rome. Epictetus advises you to accept your fate as God’s will and make a new life. To protest your fate would be to act against nature. But what if it’s Zeus’s (or whoever’s) will that you protest? And how can Epictetus know that, by protesting, you won’t be readmitted to the capital? Maybe your protest will be an event in the history of Rome and change the practice of banishment forever? Interjections like this prevent the reader becoming tired of Epictetus’ lecturing style, which often sounds a lot like browbeating to the unaccustomed ear. I found the whole book both thought-provoking and accessible, undoubtedly aided by the relative informality of the translation style. (The notes at the end were terribly stolid, however.) There is definitely something to be said for Stoicism, for focusing on what you can do rather than what you can’t, for cultivating a healthy mind (and leaving the body to itself), for disregarding material things and accepting that nothing lasts. I was reminded of the recently-read novel Stoner, which concerns a man with definite Stoic tendencies but much more concern for his family roles than any wider civic responsibility.