Sadao Hasegawa: Paintings

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As pushed forward by different cultures, this situation was set up to assign heterosexual gender roles within queer relationships. The younger being the woman, with less societal respect, assumed intelligence, and more assumed emotionality, the older being the man, with more societal respect, and assumed intelligence. These stereotypes have caused harm to both sides of these relationships and have harmed how queer relationships are seen as a whole. The crucial question here, however, concerns the effect of the Hiroshima bomb on the emperor. Both Asada and Frank make the argument that Togo’s meeting with the emperor was a crucial turning point in both men’s decision to seek an immediate end to the war on the terms stipulated by the Potsdam Proclamation. This argument, however, is not convincing. Now that such a new weapon has appeared, it has become less and less possible to continue the war. We must not miss a chance to terminate the war by bargaining [with the Allied powers, Asada adds] for more favorable conditions now. Besides, however much we consult about [surrender, Asada adds] terms we desire, we shall not be able to come to an agreement. So my wish is to make such arrangements as will end the war as soon as possible.[15] Frank’s argument is questionable in his methodology here. If he discounts Kawabe’s and Toyoda’s testimonies as having been given years after the events in question, why should Suzuki’s testimony, which was given several months after the end of the war, be deemed more reliable? Frank’s method of looking critically at testimonies made after the events is admirable, but he is inconsistent in this approach.

Kawabe’s diary also reveals his confusion. If his judgment proved wrong, logically it should follow that the strategy that he had advocated based on the erroneous assumption should have been reexamined. Instead of adopting this logical deduction, Kawabe “did not feel like peace and surrender in this situation.” This was not rational strategic thinking, but a visceral reluctance to accept surrender. The only rationale he could justify for the continuation of war was “the honor of the Yamato race.” His insistence on fighting was also a preemptive move, anticipating, quite correctly, that the peace party would launch a coordinated move to end the war. Nevertheless, his argument for the continuation of war indicated the degree of the army’s desperation and confusion. Rather, what decisively changed the views of the Japanese ruling elite was the Soviet entry into the war. It catapulted the Japanese government into taking immediate action. For the first time, it forced the government squarely to confront the issue of whether it should accept the Potsdam terms. In the tortuous discussions from August 9 through August 14, the peace party, motivated by a profound sense of betrayal, fear of Soviet influence on occupation policy, and above all by a desperate desire to preserve the imperial house, finally staged a conspiracy to impose the “emperor’s sacred decision” and accept the Potsdam terms, believing that under the circumstances surrendering to the United States would best assure the preservation of the imperial house and save the emperor. a b c d Ishii, Anne; Kidd, Chip; Kolbeins, Graham, eds. (December 18, 2014). Massive: Gay Erotic Manga and the Men Who Make It. Fantagraphics. p.277. Kawabe’s determination to fight, however, easily collapsed as soon as the emperor’s “sacred decision” was made at the imperial conference on August 10. After he was informed of the result of the imperial conference, he noted in his diary: “Alas, everything is over.” He was critical of the argument advanced by Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda, because he did not believe the conditions they had insisted upon would be accepted by the enemy. For Kawabe, there were only two options: either accept unconditional surrender or perish to maintain honor. The emperor’s decision revealed that he had completely lost his trust in the military. In Kawabe’s view, this was not merely the emperor’s opinion, but the expression of the general view broadly shared by the Japanese people as a whole. Kawabe continues: N A R U Y A M A. (n.d.). Retrieved July 28, 2021, from http://www.gallery-naruyama.com/english/exhibition-eng/sadao1978-eng.htmlAfter dismissing Kawabe’s and Toyoda’s recollections years after the events, Frank extensively quotes from Suzuki’s testimony in December 1945: According to Asada and Frank, the cabinet meeting on August 7 was a crucial turning point. Asada argues that, judging that “the introduction of a new weapon, which had drastically altered the whole military situation, offered the military ample grounds for ending the war,” Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori proposed that “surrender be considered at once on the basis of terms presented in the Potsdam Declaration [Proclamation].”[5] Frank writes: “Togo extracted from the American statements about the ‘new and revolutionary increase in destruct[ive]’ power of the atomic bomb a reason to accept the Potsdam Proclamation.”[6] As I have argued above, Japan relied on Soviet neutrality both militarily and diplomatically. Diplomatically, Japan pinned its last hope on Moscow’s mediation for the termination of the war. Only by Soviet entry into the war was Japan forced to make a decision on the Potsdam terms. Militarily as well, Japan’s Ketsu Go strategy was predicated on Soviet neutrality. That was why the General Staff’s Bureau of Military Affairs constantly overruled the Fifth Department’s alarming warnings that a Soviet invasion might be imminent. Manchuria was not written off, as Frank asserts; rather, the military was confident that it could keep the USSR neutral, at least for a while. When the Soviet invasion of Manchuria occurred, the military was taken completely by surprise. Even Asada admits, “[T]he Soviet entry spelled the strategic bankruptcy of Japan.”[98] Despite the repeated bravado calling for the continuation of the war, it pulled the rug right out from underneath the Japanese military, puncturing a gaping hole in their strategic plan. Their insistence on the continuation of the war lost its rationale. Kristian F. Power, Sadao Hasegawa gallery 1. (n.d.). Retrieved July 28, 2021, from http://www.kristianfpower.com/HSG/index.html

The news of the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima had already been brought to the emperor early in the morning on August 7, but Kido learned of it only at noon. Kido had an unusually long audience with the emperor that lasted from 1:30 to 2:05 in the Imperial Library. Kido’s diary notes: “The emperor expressed his august view on how to deal with the current situation and asked various questions.”[10] But Kido’s diary says nothing about what the emperor’s view was and what questions he asked. Later, Kido recalled that Hirohito had told him: “Now that things have come to this impasse, we must bow to the inevitable. No matter what happens to my safety, we should lose no time in ending the war so as not to have another tragedy like this.”[11] Citing Kido’s account as the decisive evidence, Asada concludes: “The Emperor was… from this time forward Japan’s foremost peace advocate, increasingly articulate and urgent in expressing his wish for peace.”[12] Frank, however, does not share Asada’s description of the emperor as the “foremost peace advocate,” viewing him as wavering at times over whether or not Japan should attach more than one condition to its acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation.[13] On November 20, 1999, [2] Hasegawa committed suicide by hanging at a hotel room in Bangkok, Thailand. [3] His artwork was initially disposed of by his family, though it was recovered upon their discovery of a note – alongside a portrait of Yukio Mishima painted on a stone – granting ownership of his works to Gallery Naruyama in Tokyo. [7] Six unseen paintings were discovered among Hasegawa's estate, which were shown in "Linga", a posthumous exhibition at Gallery Naruyama in 2000. [6] Today, Gallery Naruyama holds the majority of Hasegawa's collected works. [7] Legacy [ edit ]Before the Hiroshima bombing, Togo had already become convinced that sooner or later, Japan would have to accept the Potsdam terms. It is possible that the Hiroshima bomb further reinforced his conviction. But it bears repeating that he did not take the initiative to reverse the previous course, and that he did not propose direct negotiations with the United States and Britain. As for the emperor, it is possible that the Hiroshima bomb contributed to his urgent desire to terminate the war, but it is erroneous to say that immediately after the Hiroshima bomb, Hirohito decided to accept the Potsdam terms, as Asada asserts.

Antenne Books is a distributor for independent publishers. Established in London in 2010, Antenne Books distributes publications on art, photography, design, illustration, theory, writing, fashion and culture. With so few elders within the queer community, the ageism that already exists within society can become deadly. This is a slightly revised version of an essay published in From The End of the Pacific War, Reappraisals, edited by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa , (c) 2007 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. All rights reserved. No further reproduction or distribution is allowed without the prior written permission of the publisher, www.sup.org. Posted at Japan Focus on August 17, 2007.Kawabe further noted that the General Staff officers knew more than anyone else about the difficulty of continuing the war.[49]